Budapest. Both, the Hungarian Újszínház (New Theatre) and the Nemzeti Színház (National Theatre) are led by two right wing and, in case of  Attila Vidnyánszky, highly influantial figures: “Far-right extremist Dörner remains director of the Budapest New Theatre,” says the translated title of an article of the Neue Musikzeitung,  reported in 2016 on the occasion of György Dörner’s reappointment by the Budapest city assembly for another five-year term. Dörner had already been appointed director of the Újszínház (New Theatre) in 2011 for the first time. At the time, the decision was widely seen as politically controversial. According to media reports at the time, his appointment was in line with the agenda of then-Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

In his application, Dörner spoke out against what he described as a “degenerate, pathological liberal hegemony” in the theatre scene.

Despite eleven other applicants, the Fidesz-dominated city council selected him. Observers interpreted the appointment as a cultural policy signal from the government at the time. Dörner’s ideological positioning is also illustrated by his close connection to the now-deceased writer and politician István Csurka, who was repeatedly criticised for antisemitic statements. Dörner is considered a political ally of Csurka and initially planned even to involve him as an artistic advisor after his appointment. He remains at the helm of the New Theatre. In 2022, the Fidesz-affiliated platform DUOL reported the extension of his contract until 2027.

Criticism of cultural policy developments under the Orbán government was also voiced by former National Theatre director Róbert Alföldi. Following the change of government in 2010, he accused his successor Attila Vidnyánszky of using his position to ideologically shape and dominate the theatre sector. Alföldi criticised in particular Vidnyánszky’s extensive powers within the Hungarian cultural landscape. In his view, funding decisions and institutional influence under his leadership reflected a clear political and ideological orientation. He also argued that conservative and partly homophobic positions had become further entrenched in cultural discourse.

Vidnyánszky is also considered controversial due to the number of cultural positions he holds and his role in the restructuring of the University of Theatre and Film Arts in Budapest (SZFE). He is accused of having played a key role in the rightwing political transformation of the historically prestigious institution.

Rethinking the National Theatre

The ideological foundations of the current theatre system are also examined by theatre scholar Noémi Herczog. In her essay Performing illiberalism in Hungary: the ambiguities of an illiberal theatre portrayed by Attila Vidnyánszky’s National Theatre in Budapest on the search for an “illiberal theatre aesthetics,” she analyses Attila Vidnyánszky as one of the most influential figures in Hungarian theatre life. Herczog argues that while Vidnyánszky is closely aligned with Orbán’s political system, his artistic practice reveals internal ideological contradictions. His work combines internationalisation, nationalism, avant-garde elements, and political adaptation.

Among Herczog’s central criticisms are the concentration of cultural power through funding structures and institutional influence in Vidnyánszky’s hands, as well as the privileged position of the National Theatre. It presents itself as a “theatre of the nation,” yet does not represent the diversity of Hungarian theatre culture. Instead, it promotes a conception of theatre that places national identity at its centre while marginalising other perspectives. Herczog ultimately describes the contradictions in Vidnyánszky’s position as a possible key to his success, writing that “gaining international reputation on the one hand, pleasing the pseudo-ideology of illiberal Hungary on the other” works for his reputation.

Zoltán Imres “Re-evaluations of National Theatres in Europe in the 21st Century”

I meet Zoltán Imre in his office at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest. The theatre historian is an known expert on national theatres and European theatre history. In his essay “Re-evaluations of National Theatres in Europe in the 21st Century,” he examines the redefinition of the national theatre in the 21st century. Imre outlines two central positions: on the one hand, the view that the term “national theatre” has become a largely empty label, as its original function has lost relevance in times of globalisation and European integration. On the other hand, he refers to theatre scholar Janelle Reinelt, who argues that national theatres can still play an important role, provided they are rethought.

In 2007, Imre  and theatre director, László Hudi developed the concept “Nemzeti Színház – mindenkinek!” (“National Theatre for Everyone!”). The concept is based on the so called Scottish model as a production company with a pluralistic approach:

“We believed that a national institution should strive to create opportunities for as many activities as possible to take place and reach as many citizens as possible in the capital and the countryside as well. In our National Theatre, we wanted to create a framework that is open to a wide range of artists and audiences on different professional and amateur levels for adults and children alike.”

Instead of a single central institution in Budapest, they propose a mobile network that includes different regions and social groups. The national theatre is thus understood as a space of diversity and exchange.

“We did not intend to create another elite centre in the capital of Hungary. We thought that if there is something that we can call elite, let us not gather it into a single centre, let us not try to tear it out of its natural environment, but let us seek it out and help it to have an effect where it is created and present. We wanted these creators to have opportunities, to have their work supported, to have a focus, but primarily in the places where they are creating.”

For them, a national theatre is only truly “national” when it makes social diversity visible and creates spaces for discussion and participation.

About Funding, Loyalty, and Control in Hungarian Theatre

In the interview, I ask Zoltán Imre about his perception of the current Hungarian theatre landscape, with a particular focus on the independent scene.

Drawing on more than 25 years of experience in the theatre sector, he describes the National Theatre as  “seemingly  more open, though Vidnyánszky and foreign guest-directors influenced mainly the intuition”, while the New Theatre  stages works only by Hungarian authors, including even those containing openly right-wing or antisemitic narratives. The independent scene, by contrast, is structurally disadvantaged and has been chronically underfunded for many years.

Speaking about the Hungarian theatre system, Imre distinguishes between so-called “stone theatres”, meaning state- or municipally or jointly funded repertory theatres with permanent ensembles, and the independent sector, funded basically by the National Cultural Fund (NKA) through yearly application. The National and the New Theatre belong to the “stone theatres”, and despite of their huge economic support, their influence  on actual audiences remains limited:

“People simply do not bother to go there. Not even right wings, not even Fidesz-supporters.”

He describes a situation of weak audience engagement in which even subsidised, therefore cheap tickets attract little demand, and sometimes school classes  being instructed to attend performances. More central, however, is not the question of audiences but of political control. According to Imre, the allocation of leadership positions was determined most of all by political loyalty in the past 16 year: “the most important thing in the selection was political loyalty.” As a result, especially regional theatres are shaped by politically aligned directors.

At the same time, ideological positioning is not always directly visible in repertoire choices:  “you can’t detect directly.” While some productions contain national-conservative or ideologically charged elements, overall repertoires tend to be heterogeneous, including classical works, international, mainly European plays, collaborations, and some contemporary pieces. According to Imre, political orientation is more evident at the level of management than within acting ensembles.

The independent scene, however, is weakened by structural underfunding. This development also has political implications: “the government do not censor them, but silence them by not financing them.” Funding is distributed through the National Cultural Fund (NKA), whose resources for independent companies have significantly decreased in recent years. As a result, many influential independent companies (Krétakör lead by Árpád Schilling, Szputnyik lead by Viktor Bodó, Tünet Együttes lead by Réka Szabó for instance) finished their activities and some of their members and leaders even left Hungary.

Imre also refers to reforms after 2010. A theatre law introduced in 2008 had established six categories and included a binding provision stipulating that at least 10% of state theatre funding should go to the independent sector. After 2010, this system was replaced by a model in which support for the independent sector became discretionary rather than guaranteed.

In retrospect, Imre describes the period before 2010 as a kind of “Golden Age” of the independent scene, despite already existing financial constraints: “from now, that seems as the golden age from the 1990 until 2010.” Regarding the role of the National Theatre, he highlights a major shift under Attila Vidnyánszky. His appointment in 2013 marked a structural break: “first he immediately closed down the repertoire of the previous directorship, and then started to build a sort of right-wing, nationalist repertoire.”

Political tendencies, according to Imre, become visible for instance in the staging of social issues, including discussions around gender issues or the promotion of a conservative family model. Some productions explicitly reflect such narratives, sometimes also through interventions by artistic leadership. At the same time, Imre cautions against generalizing the political stance of theatre personnel. Actors are bound by annual contracts: “if the director doesn’t want to renew your contract, you are jobless.”

When asked about future perspectives, Imre emphasizes the need for the renewal of the cultural dialogue among the different sectors of the theatre world and even for a more urgent need to re-think the entire Hungarian theatre system. After reform debates in the 1990s and early 2000s, a crucial period of systemic discussion was interrupted. Today, he argues, there is again an opportunity to reopen these fundamental questions about the financing and organization of the Hungarian theatres.

Sources: Neue Musikzeitung, hvg.hu, deutschlandfunk.de, Essay: Noémi Herczog’s  “Performing illiberalism in Hungary: the ambiguities of an illiberal theatre portrayed by Attila Vidnyánszky’s National Theatre in Budapest”, Essay: Zoltan Imre “Re-evaluations of National Theatres in Europe in the 21st century”
Photo: Zoltán Imre

Budapest. The loss of power by Viktor Orbán was neither a sudden electoral accident nor a short-lived protest reaction. The parliamentary election of April 12, 2026 instead marked the collapse of a political system that had spent sixteen years presenting itself as untouchable. With the victory of the Tisza Party under Péter Magyar, the central assumption of Orbánism disintegrated: that there was no realistic alternative to Fidesz in Hungary.

The numbers from recent weeks illustrate how profound this collapse has become. According to a current survey by the Publicus Institute, Fidesz-KDNP has fallen to just 17 percent support among the general population, while the Tisza Party stands at 55 percent. Among committed voters, the ratio is even more dramatic, with 73 percent backing the new governing party compared to 20 percent for Fidesz. Particularly striking is the fact that even 31 percent of Fidesz voters now say they are optimistic about the new government.

This development cannot be explained solely by Magyar’s popularity. Orbán instead lost political credibility simultaneously across several decisive fronts: morally, economically, communicatively, and ultimately psychologically.

The real turning point began in early 2024 with the pardon scandal surrounding former president Katalin Novák. The pardon of a man involved in covering up sexual abuse at a children’s home struck directly at the ideological core of the Fidesz narrative. For years, the government had portrayed itself as the moral defender of family values and child protection. Within days, that self-image collapsed.

It was precisely at this moment that Péter Magyar broke away from the inner circle of power. The former Fidesz insider linked his public revolt against the government with the accusation that the project of a “national, sovereign, civic Hungary” had become a political façade concealing corruption and concentration of power. Because the criticism came from a former member of the system itself, it appeared more credible than years of attacks from the traditional opposition.

The Loss of Social Control

Orbán’s second major defeat involved the loss of control over the political public sphere. Fidesz still dominated much of the traditional media market, but the party lost its ability to define the national mood.

Magyar understood early on that conventional opposition campaigns stood little chance against the media superiority of Fidesz. Instead, he relied on constant physical presence. His nationwide tours through small towns and villages broke through the communicative isolation upon which the government system had long depended. While Orbán increasingly organized tightly controlled events, Magyar sought direct confrontation with voters.

The contrast became visible during the 2026 campaign. For the first time in years, Orbán returned to public appearances before open crowds. Yet instead of disciplined loyalty, he was met with protests and boos. One particularly symbolic moment occurred in March, when Orbán shouted at demonstrators and accused them of wanting a “pro-Ukrainian government.” The footage spread virally and created the impression of a prime minister who could no longer control the social reality around him.

The government also lost its digital dominance. Although Orbán still had significantly more Facebook followers than Magyar, the Tisza leader generated far higher engagement rates. His short videos, improvised livestreams, and direct communication appeared more authentic than the highly professionalized government propaganda machine. Younger voters in particular moved sharply away from Fidesz. According to polling data, roughly two-thirds of younger voters supported the opposition.

The rupture with the younger generation also had cultural causes. The government increasingly appeared anachronistic. Conflicts surrounding Budapest nightlife, morality-driven political campaigns, and years of war and threat rhetoric intensified among many young Hungarians the feeling of social stagnation.

Everyday Reality Against Sovereignty Rhetoric

In the end, Orbán above all lost against the country’s social reality. The Hungarian economy had already shown clear signs of exhaustion before the election. Inflation, rising living costs, and structural problems in healthcare and education increasingly dominated everyday life. For years, Fidesz had managed to overshadow economic difficulties through national mobilization campaigns, anti-migration rhetoric, and geopolitical conflict narratives. By 2026, that strategy no longer worked.

Orbán’s Russia policy became particularly problematic. The prime minister built much of his campaign around foreign policy polarization, claiming the opposition would drag Hungary into war or subordinate the country to Ukrainian interests. This argument, however, lost substantial credibility after reports emerged about alleged Russian influence operations during the campaign and Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó faced accusations of sharing internal EU discussions with Moscow.

For Orbán, the symbolism was historically sensitive. The politician who in 1989 had demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops now found himself confronted with the slogan “Ruszkik haza” — “Russians go home” — a phrase once directed against Soviet domination and now increasingly aimed at his own government.

Magyar systematically exploited this shift. Since his inauguration on May 9, his government has attempted to visibly reorder the material priorities of the state. While Orbán focused on sovereignty, security rhetoric, and geopolitical confrontation, Magyar speaks about hospitals, schools, EU funds, and living costs.

This became especially visible in his criticism of the previous government’s military prestige projects. Hungary, Magyar argued, does not need “spy satellites” but functioning public services. In doing so, he directly addressed the social exhaustion that had accumulated over many years.

The new government also began exposing the economic networks of the old system. Ministerial transition audits reportedly uncovered chaotic administrative conditions and multi-billion-forint contracts signed immediately after the election defeat. Magyar additionally announced plans to terminate overpriced state rental contracts linked to István Tiborcz and to legally re-examine the party-aligned asset foundations created during the Fidesz era.

Yet the most important effect of these first weeks may lie elsewhere entirely: many Hungarians now feel for the first time that Fidesz is no longer untouchable.

That psychological rupture probably explains the party’s rapid decline better than any individual campaign issue. Orbán did not simply lose votes. He lost the political aura of historical inevitability that had sustained his rule for sixteen years.

Sources: Publicus, Politico Europe, Wikipedia
Photo: Viktor Orbán (Wikipedia/EU)

Budapest. The Terror Háza Múzeum (“House of Terror”) describes its cultural significance on its website in the words of museum director Mária Schmidt: “Hungarians have long memories – for both the good and the bad. They are forever grateful for the good, and carve the bad into their collective memory, so as to never allow it to happen again.”

Schmidt is considered a close confidante and advisor to Viktor Orbán. Her political stance is evident, among other things, in her statement regarding the reevaluation of Miklós Horthy. As the “Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung” reported in 2014, Schmidt argued that Horthy should not be judged “solely on the basis of his responsibility for the Holocaust”; he should “not be ‘one-sidedly labeled with negative adjectives’.”

According to Magdalena Marsovszky, the glorification of the Horthy era and references to the period of dualism (Austria-Hungary) are integral parts of the government’s ideology under Viktor Orbán. At the local level, politicians close to Fidesz have repeatedly initiated or supported the erection of Horthy monuments.

The controversy surrounding the House of Terror has now even reached travel guides. For instance, the travel platform Ulysses Travel describes the museum as a rather gloomy place that sensitive visitors would be better off avoiding. This travel recommendation is thus more reminiscent of an advertisement for a haunted house than a recommendation for a national history museum.

Against the backdrop of existing criticism, this article aims to examine the political staging of the past at the “House of Terror” in Budapest. For background information, we drew on Magdalena Marsovszky’s article “The Martyrs Are the Magyars.” Additional insights are based on a personal exchange with the author, in which she elaborated on and clarified her positions.

“The Martyrs Are the Magyars” – An Analysis by Magdalena Marsovszky

Magdalena Marsovszky, born in Hungary, holds a Ph.D. in social and cultural studies, is an art historian, and a freelance writer. She conducts research on ethnic esotericism, antisemitism, and antiziganism at the “Right-Wing Populism” Research Center at the University of Cologne. She contributed her scholarly expertise to this article. In her piece “The Martyrs Are the Magyars,” Marsovszky analyzes the role of the House of Terror in Hungarian memory culture. She describes how the museum’s concept is shaped by a “national perspective” that interprets history ethnically and portrays Hungary as a collective victim. What Marsovszky calls the “ethnic closure of society” describes the process by which Hungary “ethnicizes” itself in its culture of remembrance—that is, defines itself through perceived threats to the national community, such as communism, liberalism, or modernization.

At the center lies a “national victim myth” that deflects historical responsibility and projects guilt onto others. This reversal of perpetrator and victim roles is a pattern well known in Antisemitism research. The Holocaust and Hungary’s shared responsibility are thereby relativized. Antisemitic interpretive patterns also belong to this narrative.  Right-wing and nationalist actors portray themselves as liberators from forces that are antisemitically coded as “Jewish”—for example, in “anti-communist Antisemitism” or in “anti-liberal Antisemitism,” which depicts Western democracy and liberalism as expressions of an alleged Jewish influence. Marsovszky views the museum’s very conception as evidence of this interpretation of history. In her assessment, the museum’s antisemitic elements are found primarily in the “insinuations”—that is, in indirect hints and omissions.

Equating Dictatorships and Downplaying the Holocaust at the House of Terror

When asked whether the House of Terror deliberately equates Nazism and communism, Marsovszky rejects a purely instrumental interpretation. From a social science perspective, she argues that the issue is less about deliberate manipulation and more about deeply ingrained cultural and social-psychological patterns.

Nevertheless, the museum presents both systems—the Arrow Cross regime and communism—in parallel and portrays Hungary as a victim of both regimes. Even at the entrance, the symbols of the two dictatorships are juxtaposed as mirror images.

At the same time, the exhibition shifts historical proportions: the Nazi period is said to begin only with the German invasion on March 19, 1944, thereby largely obscuring the Horthy era and its antisemitic legislation.

“Now, however, the exhibition itself dates the ‘fascist system of injustice’ only from the invasion of German troops into Hungary—March 19, 1944—while the two decades prior under Nikolaus von Horthy (1920–1944), during which ethno-nationalist, Antisemitic, and revisionist policies—including the very first ‘Jewish laws’ in Europe (1920)—paved the way for the final and most destructive chapter of the Holocaust, the murder of nearly half a million Hungarian Jews, and the reign of terror by the Arrow Cross Party, are not even mentioned.”

In contrast, the “socialist system of injustice” occupies significantly more space. The years 1945 to 1989 are portrayed as a continuous dictatorship, even though, according to Marsovszky, repression in late state socialism “was significantly relaxed.”

This shift is also evident in the spatial layout: two rooms are devoted to National Socialism, while 21 rooms cover the communist era.

“Thus, the House of Terror essentially mutates into the ‘House of Communist Terror.’”

In addition to this relativization of the Holocaust, Marsovszky refers to earlier statements by museum director Mária Schmidt. As early as 1999, Schmidt took a relativizing stance; Marsovszky quotes from a lecture by Schmidt that she translated.

“World War II was not about Judaism or genocide. As much as it pains us to say it: The Holocaust—the extermination or salvation of the Jewish people—was a secondary, so to speak, marginal consideration that was not the war aim of any of the opposing sides. /…/ It must also be noted that the Allies did not declare war on Nazi Germany under any circumstances to prevent the planned genocidal policy against the Jews. They had neither the intention of taking in the displaced persons nor of protecting them. Therefore, nothing extraordinary—in other words, unique—happened to them. In our century /…/ a whole series of mass murders and genocides has taken place, though these were consciously perceived by the outside world, with or without sympathy. Likewise, the world—at least those interested or those affected—knew what had been happening since the Bolshevik Revolution in socialist Russia, Soviet Russia, or the Soviet Union, which promised a New World. In the interest of consolidating their rule, the communist regimes elevated mass murder to a genuine method of governance.”

The text is taken from a lecture delivered at the Eckhardt Academy in Budapest on November 13, 1999, and was later published in the daily newspaper Magyar Hírlap under the title “Holokausztok a huszadik században” (“Holocausts in the 20th Century”).

The “House of Terror” in the Context of Orbán’s “Illiberal Democracy”

Marsovszky situates the House of Terror within the political context of Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy.” The political development, which was already apparent during Orbán’s first term in office (1998–2002) and was openly referred to as “illiberal democracy” after his return to power in 2010, is also reflected in the museum’s conception. According to Marsovszky, the museum served not only as a site of historical representation but also as a meeting place and platform for opposition activities aligned with Fidesz. Following the electoral defeat in 2002, Fidesz, KDNP, and later the far-right Jobbik established a national and “ethnic” “völkisch” (racial-national) hegemony through the media, civic networks, and cultural institutions. The House of Terror played an important role in this by offering opposition forces space for events and political campaigns.

According to Marsovszky, the political situation at the time resulted in the following:

“This led—especially given the deficiencies in democracy, the reversal of perpetrator and victim roles, and the failure to properly recognize the warning signs of growing authoritarian tendencies—to such an infiltration of society that the Fidesz-KDNP coalition won the 2010 parliamentary elections with a two-thirds majority.”

Even after Orbán’s election victory in 2010, the museum remained, in their view, a central component of the political restructuring. The foundation associated with the museum has developed into an important think tank for the government and has invited international representatives of the New Right, including Alain de Benoist (French ideologue of the New Right) and Steve Bannon (former head of the far-right website “Breitbart News Network” and former advisor to Donald Trump).

“From the very beginning, the Terror House Museum has engaged in victim-perpetrator reversal, distorts history, and its work is illiberal and anti-democratic.”

How the museum shapes historical consciousness in Hungary

“Denial of guilt and victim-perpetrator reversal, along with revisionism, have been among the cornerstones of the Orbán governments”

According to Marsovszky, this form of historical representation has a significant influence on public historical consciousness in Hungary. It is closely linked to the political symbolism of the Orbán governments. As an example, she cites the elevation of the so-called Holy Crown, which was ceremoniously transferred from the Hungarian National Museum to the Hungarian Parliament building in 2000, as well as the emphasis on the “historical constitution” in the Hungarian Fundamental Law that came into force in 2012.

This reinforces a sacralized conception of the nation in which national identity and state sovereignty are based on historical and mythical traditions.

“The ‘historical constitution’ is described in government publications as the foundation of national identity and national sovereignty, so that—to put it in scientific terms—esotericism forms the basis of state ideology.”

Through this cultural expression of nationalist ideology, public historical consciousness is shaped toward an illiberal, strongly nationalistic self-image.

Hope for a More Critical Culture of Remembrance Under Péter Magyar

“The future prime minister, Péter Magyar, delivered an excellent speech on May 4, May 2026 in the Academy’s ballroom, in which he emphasized that the new Tisza government would respect academic freedom based on source- and fact-oriented, empirical, and critical scientific research under all circumstances, promote scientific institutions, and guarantee their freedom. Such a promise is significant because only through it can critical reflection in historical research continue to develop. In the course of such critical reflection, the concept of the Terrorhaus Museum would also need to be rethought. It is to be hoped that this will take place within a societal discourse in which the past is not regarded as a closed chapter, but rather as an ongoing endeavor within the process of democratization.”

Sources: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Ulysses Travel, Wikipedia.de, Magdalena Marsovszky auf Academia.edu, Website des Hauses des Terrors, Magdalena Marsovszkys Beitrag „Die Märtyrer sind die Magyaren“ in: Die Dynamik der europäischen Rechten, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (2011)

Photos: Anna Katharina Breitling – Pester Lloyd / Please include the URL and the author’s name when using this material. Portrait of Magdalena Marsovszky, Copyright by Magdalena Marsovszky

After a period she herself describes as traumatic, Tóth plans to spend more time in Hungary again. In the meantime, she is once more being invited to events in places that previously ignored her  including schools. For over a decade, she says, she had been banned from the Hungarian media—like many other intellectuals. She describes the Hungarian cultural landscape as deeply divided; hate speech has long become part of everyday life. Personal attacks and public defamation, she says, were part of Orbán’s propaganda:

“I was called a traitor countless times – by people who themselves contributed nothing to Hungarian culture. I assume that this poisoning will not remain without consequences. It will take a long time for these wounds to heal.”

*English version published by Sevenstories New York (Oct 25) ; also available in Croation and Italian, with translations to French, Spanish, Greek and Tamil due in 2027.

“A month later, a witch hunt was underway”

Tóth reports targeted defamation campaigns and how she was publicly discredited by government-aligned media. After she suggested in an interview to replace a work by Mór Jókai in the school canon with a work of contemporary literature, she became the target of media campaigns that intruded deeply into her private life due to their aggressiveness. Even before the interview, one of her self-authored textbooks had already been banned by the Orbán government; only a centrally controlled standardized edition of textbooks was permitted. In the media, she was defamed as a “mediocre nobody” who “who wanted to eradicate the great national classic from schools.” Deliberately unflattering photos of Tóth were published, and she was publicly analyzed as “untalented” and “stupid.”

She also experienced defamation in her private life, including threatening emails. A teacher at her daughter’s school shared the defamatory newspaper article via the email distribution list with other parents; some stopped greeting her. The media began referring to Tóth as a “traitor,” television viewers voted on her alleged incompetence, and her appearance was mocked. In her everyday life, she was exposed to verbal attacks from strangers; she describes an incident in which she was spat at on the metro. On social media, insulting and racist comments about her children also appeared. At times, she no longer dared to leave the house.

Defamation as a Political Instrument

Her identity as a divorced woman and adoptive mother of a Roma child made her an “ideal target” for misogynistic and racist narratives. The attacks on her as a woman also functioned as a form of mass mobilisation:

“Those who enjoyed seeing a woman suffer in the digital space willingly joined in. Even strangers wrote insulting, sexually explicit messages and threatened me and my children.”

She assesses these attacks as deliberate intimidation meant to demonstrate what criticism under Viktor Orbán’s system entails. She describes the experience as an existential rupture, the consequences of which continue to this day:

“I remember everything and I forget nothing. I will never forgive the Orbán regime’s propaganda machine for what they did.”

She adds that the otherwise independent magazine HVG also contributed significantly to the events through an anonymous article, without having apologised to this day.

“I am a Hungarian writer, and my readers are in Hungary. I will now spend more time in Budapest. But the wounds will not heal, and I cannot forgive. They have hurt and humiliated me. I have done nothing other than bring a good reputation to this country. For me, what happened was an existential rupture.”

Cultural Policy under and After Orbán

When asked whether she plans to return to Hungary in the future and how she assesses the potential of a new government, Tóth responds with hopes and expectations for the period after a possible change of government.

She describes a clear imbalance between the art academies: one of them received substantial financial support under Orbán, with its members receiving high monthly stipends. The second, independent academy, by contrast, receives no state funding and does not have anything close to comparable resources—although it includes two Nobel Prize winners among its members, Péter Nádas and Péter Esterházy. She sees the future of these academies after the end of Orbán’s rule as uncertain. Due to his influence, the original structures are unlikely to be restorable; moreover, the immediate priority will be the recovery of the depleted economy as well as the rebuilding of industry and agriculture.

The education system is also in a poor state, including a shortage of teachers, whose resolution will take a considerable amount of time. On a positive note, Tóth emphasises that she considers the new Minister of Education in a Péter Magyar government to be competent and open, and that women generally hold important positions: “The immediate deputy of Péter Magyar is also a woman, which sends a strong message in this macho society.”

Misogynistic narratives in political Discourse

Tóth expects that the political climate will change only very slowly. Public discourse, she says, continues to be shaped by problematic practices and narratives. As an example, she refers to the circulation of an image by the popular anti-Orbán influencer Róbert Puzsér, which he published after the victory of the Tisza Party. It shows an explicitly sexual act in which Fidesz, represented as a woman in bed, is humiliated by the Tisza Party, which is depicted as the man.

She situates this example within the political climate she criticises:

“I find this terrifying and disgusting! The subordinate position is weak and, according to a Hungarian, misogynistic way of thinking, a woman. This attitude must absolutely disappear, because otherwise we will never belong to Europe in our thinking. The influencer publicly said it was just an opinion and that the image is very funny – whoever does not like it simply does not understand humour … This must change, otherwise we will fall back exactly to where we are trying to work our way out of!”

She assesses the extent of Orbán’s long-term propaganda as a deep division within the country, as it has “caused significant psychological damage,” the repair of which will take at least a decade

Language, Visibility, and Literary Responsibility

When asked what challenges women writers are particularly confronted with today, Tóth identifies language as the main one: Hungarian women writers depend on translations in order to achieve international relevance. She also sees engagement with broader political phenomena as a priority, rather than focusing exclusively on individual experiences.

She hopes that in contemporary Hungarian literature, gender will increasingly recede into the background and that women writers will be perceived not as “women in literature” but as part of literature as a whole. However, she says, there is still a long way to go before this becomes the norm in Hungary.

“I do not want people to kiss my hand, really not, I want to be treated as an equal human being, and I do not want to be asked anymore who is taking care of my child while I am at a Hungarian book presentation!”

A central position she holds is that experiences should be told in a universally relatable way; authenticity, she argues, contributes significantly to understanding.

“For example, I have been hurt, but I do not want that to be my topic. At the same time, I cannot ignore it. I will continue my work as before. I believe that a writer must keep a distance from current power, in fact from any power. Literature must be independent and maintain critical distance from current events. In my opinion, good literature asks questions, it does not give answers. It tries to ask the most important questions: Where is the world heading? How can we preserve our personal integrity? What role does literature play in this – how can it help?”

Only in this way, she argues, can the polarisation of thought promoted by Orbán, as well as the coarsening and vulgarisation of language, be countered:

“It is a populist method to simplify reality and claim that one has understood it, but the task of thinkers is to grasp the world in all its diversity and subtlety.”

Which contemporary Hungarian women writers should international readers know?

“I would definitely recommend the works of Petra Szőcs. Mónika Mesterházi is an excellent poet and translator of English literature, as is Anna Szabó T. Réka Mán-Várhegyi and Edina Szvoren are also outstanding prose writers.”

“In general, there has been a clear hostility towards intellectuals.”

Viktor Orbán has repeatedly constructed various groups as enemies, including migrants, the EU, and also educated women. Tóth explains that this persistent construction of enemy figures has created a sense of threat, whereby criticism could be labelled as “betrayal.” As a result, despite 54 published books, she is perceived not through her work but through Orbán’s propaganda.

According to Tóth, Orbán has fostered a general hostility towards intellectuals and artists through political measures and the public devaluation of their work. Internationally known philosophers such as the late Ágnes Heller were taken to court; during the global pandemic, part of the polemical treatment of critical voices included telling artists they should “get a job.”

Tóth on the Rejection of Critical Art in Orbán’s Hungary:

“Authoritarian societies do not like real art, only kitsch – especially historical kitsch that produces a false nostalgia for the past. Populist leaders insist that art must be accessible to the general public. In reality, however, they promote nonsense and kitsch, because real art is a danger – it raises questions.”

She stresses that not only publicly defamed individuals suffered under Orbán; the dignity of those drawn into the system – including children – was also severely violated.

The role of literature when democratic norms are under pressure

“We must restore the integrity of thinking and rebuild a culture of debate. We must make the importance of argumentation and reason clear. Viktor Orbán relied on short, simplified messages that appeal to emotions. However, politics based on hatred is not sustainable in the long term. Literature must restore trust in language, because only through words and stories can we understand one another and the complex world around us.”

Sources: Krisztina Tóth, tothkrisztina.com

Pictures: tothkrisztina.com, Copyright by Krisztina Tóth

Voter turnout reached 79.55% (5,971,425 votes cast out of 7,506,495 eligible voters), significantly higher than the 67.8% recorded in the 2022 election— a record level and an indicator of the extraordinary political mobilization of this vote.

The following interactive map provides a detailed geographical overview of the election results:

The full chronology of this historic election day, as well as all major developments, can be found in our comprehensive live ticker.

The Breakthrough: From Protest Movement to Mass Party

The election victory marks the most consistent transformation process within Hungary’s opposition landscape since liberation from Soviet occupation. The Tisza Party, which only a few years ago lacked structural anchoring in the legislature, managed within a short period to establish itself as the dominant force in the opposition spectrum.

Central to this rise was a strategic focus on:

• urban voter centers, particularly Budapest
• the expanding middle class in the suburban belt
• voter segments with high sensitivity to EU affairs and governance

In these milieus, Tisza achieved approval ratings exceeding 55–60% in several constituencies, enabling a surge of direct mandates.

The Geography of the Result: Capital and Agglomeration as Key

The election reveals a clear territorial structure. While Tisza fully dominated the capital—winning all 16 of 16 direct mandates in Budapest—the party also achieved a decisive breakthrough in Pest County. In the 14 constituencies surrounding the capital, Tisza secured majorities, particularly in rapidly growing agglomeration areas such as Érd, Budaörs, and Szentendre.

Nationwide, Tisza led in 92 of the 106 constituencies, while Fidesz secured majorities in 13 constituencies and Mi Hazánk in one constituency (Veszprém 02)—a clear indicator of the breadth of the political shift.

The traditional Fidesz strongholds in rural areas remained partly stable but were unable to compensate for losses in demographically dynamic regions.

The Role of Constituency Architecture – Fidesz Gerrymandering

The election was held for the first time under the conditions of the reform introduced by Act LXXIX of 2024. The reduction of constituencies in Budapest and their expansion in Pest County had already triggered significant political controversy in advance.

From the government’s perspective, this was a necessary adjustment to demographic realities. The opposition, however, spoke of targeted constituency design aimed at weakening urban votes (so-called gerrymandering). The election results suggest that these measures were unable to halt the structural shift. Tisza was able to secure majorities even in newly redrawn constituencies.

Candidates, Campaign, Leadership

The personalization of the campaign played a central role. Péter Magyar positioned himself not only as an opposition leader but as a direct, electable alternative to the existing political system.

At the same time, the party relied on candidate profiles signaling economic competence and institutional experience. In several key constituencies, figures from the private sector ran, particularly in suburban regions.

The Coming Government Formation and Institutional Dynamics

Following the election victory, the question of government formation arises immediately. With 136 mandates, Tisza has not only an absolute majority but also the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendments and is therefore not dependent on coalition partners.

The previous dominance of Fidesz within key power structures now meets a new political leadership with extensive room for maneuver. Magyar has already called on several office holders to resign voluntarily or face immediate forced replacement.

Besides Tisza and Fidesz, only the far-right party Mi Hazánk managed to surpass the five-percent threshold, securing a total of 6 mandates.

Market and Investor Perspective: Stability with Reorientation

For international investors, the focus is shifting from political continuity to institutional adaptability. In the medium term, attention will center on relations with the European Union as well as possible changes in economic and subsidy policy—under Orbán heavily benefiting a selected circle of party affiliates. Budapest and its surrounding agglomeration areas are likely to play a central role as economic and political hubs. With Magyar’s announcement to directly repair key rule-of-law mechanisms, the EU has also signaled its willingness to quickly release frozen funds amounting to up to 20 billion.

Hungary’s economic outlook has thus improved abruptly: competitive conditions are expected to improve significantly in a less corrupt environment, and pending EU funds could generate a strong growth effect.

Sources: valasztas.hu, statista.de
Photo: Péter Magyar / Facebook